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COGNITIVE INTERPRETATION OF KANT’S THEORY 
OF AESTHETIC IDEAS 
MOJCA KUPLEN
The aim of my paper is to argue that Kant’s aesthetic ideas can help us to overcome
cognitive limitations that we often experience in our attempts to articulate the meaning of
abstract concepts. I claim that aesthetic ideas, as expressed in works of art, have a cognitive
dimension in that they reveal the introspective, emotional, and aﬀective aspects that appear
to be central to the content of abstract phenomena. 
I
Most of us share the intuitive feeling that abstract concepts are harder to
understand than concrete, empirical concepts.1 This is evident, for example, from
the feelings of insecurity and struggle that we experience each time we try 
to explain the meaning of concepts such as truth, love, hopelessness, or
vulnerability.2 Ralph Ellis nicely describes this experience: ‘When we begin to say
what we mean by “in love”, most of us find ourselves struggling, questioning and
revising what we think we mean by it […] There was an unsureness, a hesitance,
a fear of saying what we did not mean, or not being able to say what we did
mean.’3 Yet we do not experience any diﬃculty in grasping the meaning of
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1 One should bear in mind the distinction between abstractness and abstraction. Even
though all concepts are abstracted from experience, not all of them are abstract
concepts. Category members of abstract concepts are non-material, non-concrete,
and non-sensory-perceivable objects in contrast to superordinate concepts (like the
concepts of animal, furniture, artefact, and so forth), whose members are all concrete
and sensory-perceivable objects. See Anna Borghi and Ferdinand Binkofski, Words as
Social Tools: An Embodied View on Abstract Concepts (New York: Springer, 2014), 3–4.
2 Even though concepts of emotions such as ‘love’ or ‘hopelessness’ are usually included
in the category of abstract concepts, since they both refer to non-concrete and non-
physical objects, contemporary cognitive science and psycholinguistics tend to keep
them apart. This is because emotion concepts (such as happiness, hopefulness, love,
sadness, anxiety, jealousy, and loneliness) refer directly to internal aﬀective states and
have a direct bodily counterpart, while abstract concepts lack these two characteristics.
Rather, they refer to mental states, cognitive processes, personality traits, situations,
and events (for example, concepts such as time, thought, death, truth, infinity, chaos,
patriotism) which might have an indirect emotional or affective association (for
example, the concept of death might be associated with negative emotional
experiences such as fear). See ibid., 2–11. In this paper I refer to both kinds of concept
as abstract.
3 Ralph D. Ellis, Questioning Consciousness: The Interplay of Imagery, Cognition, and Emotion
in the Human Brain (Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1995), 73.
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concrete, empirical concepts. The meaning of a concept, say, the concept of
a flower, is quickly available to us in terms of a specific set of physical properties
that can be perceived by one or more of the senses. Ellis writes that our attempts
in explaining the meaning of empirical concepts are accompanied by the feeling
of confidence ‘that we could call up certain images, but normally without actually
calling them up in order to prove to ourselves that we can do it’.4 Our
understanding of concepts is ultimately dependent on our ability to explain their
meanings in imaginable terms. In comparison with empirical concepts, however,
abstract concepts do not have a physical, perceptual and thus imaginable
referent. To the extent that such concepts lack a direct perceptual and imaginable
counterpart, they are more diﬃcult to comprehend and understand.
Such a view is supported by contemporary studies in cognitive science.
Numerous research studies show that abstract concepts are much more diﬃcult
to understand than concrete or determinate concepts.5 This diﬀerence is known
as the concreteness eﬀect and is commonly explained by two main theories – Dual
Coding Theory (DCT) and Context Availability Theory (CAT). In short, DCT claims
that comprehension of concepts depends on two interconnected systems:
a verbal system, responsible for processing verbal information, and an imaginal
system, responsible for processing nonverbal information and for generating
mental images.6 According to this theory, abstract concepts are harder to
understand because they lack an additional perceptual source of information
that concrete concepts have. CAT, on the other hand, claims that conceptual
processing depends on contextual and situational information.7 For example,
understanding the meaning of the concept ‘chair’ depends not merely on
knowing its physical properties, but also on relevant situations in which the object
occurs or is used. Abstract concepts are more diﬃcult to understand because they
have a weaker connection to contextual information. 
In sum, both theories show that perceptual information plays an important
role in conceptual processing; in order for us to comprehend and fully understand
abstract thoughts and ideas, they must in some sense be connected with
concrete and imaginable representations. One way to evoke imagery for abstract
concepts is by means of their associations with empirical concepts. For instance,
4 Ibid.
5 For a survey of these studies, see Katja Wiemer-Hastings and Xu Xu, ‘Content Diﬀerences
for Abstract and Concrete Concepts’, Cognitive Science 29 (2005): 719–36.
6 The main advocate of DCT is Allan Paivio. See his Mental Representations: A Dual Coding
Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).  
7 Paula J. Schwanenflugel, ‘Why Are Abstract Concepts Hard to Understand?’, 
in The Psychology of Word Meanings, ed. Paula J. Schwanenflugel (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum,
1991), 223–50.
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the abstract concept ‘religion’ can evoke imagery indirectly by means of its
association with the empirical concept ‘church’. Or the concept ‘justice’ can evoke
imagery through its association with a particular situation, such as a court trial.
Availability of such referential imagery presumably eliminates the concreteness
eﬀect and produces better processing and understanding of abstract
phenomena.
It is difficult, however, to see how such referential imagery could convey 
the meaning of abstract concepts since it is determined by our own subjective
experiences. Numerous studies in cognitive science have argued that the content
of abstract concepts involves not merely features that can be explicitly articulated
in words and propositions, but also experience-related properties, that is to say,
‘properties expressing subjective experiences’ that are more diﬃcult to express
in ordinary language.8 Consider, for example, the concept of hopelessness. One
can explicitly articulate the meaning of hopelessness as being an emotion with
a negative view of the future. However, this conceptual meaning cannot give a full
account of the idea of hopelessness as we experience it from the inside, as
determined by our own beliefs, thoughts, memories, desires, feelings, interests,
goals, and so forth. When we try to explain the meaning of the idea of
hopelessness, we feel that there is always much more that is implicitly present in
our awareness of the meaning than we are able to explicitly articulate, and that
this implicit meaning we internally experience is far more specific, precise, and
complex than we can capture in words. This is because, as Gendlin points out, our
ordinary words and concepts refer to our experiences indirectly by means of
general characteristics that are abstracted from our experiences, and as such they
are logically incapable of grasping and communicating introspective, aﬀective,
and emotional aspects associated with concepts such as hopelessness.9 But how
we experience hopelessness does appear to have an eﬀect on our understanding
of the idea of hopelessness itself. Mark Johnson, who argues for the qualitative
dimension of meaning as part of our understanding of abstract phenomena,
captures this idea accordingly: ‘the meaning is in what you think and feel and do,
and it lies in recurring qualities, patterns, and structures of experience that are,
for the most part, unconsciously and automatically shaping how you understand,
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8 Wiemer-Hastings and Xu, ‘Content Diﬀerences’, 719. See also Lawrence W. Barsalou and
Katja Wiemer-Hastings, ‘Situating Abstract Concepts’, in Grounding Cognition: The Role
of Perception and Action in Memory, Language, and Thinking, ed. Diane Pecher and Rolf
A. Zwaan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 129–63; Schwanenflugel,
‘Why Are Abstract Concepts Hard’; Stavroula-Thaleia Kousta et al., ‘The Representation
of Abstract Words: Why Emotion Matters’, Journal of Experimental Psychology 140 (2011):
14–34.
9 Eugene T. Gendlin, ‘The Experiential Response’, in Use of Interpretation in Treatment,
ed. Emanuel Hammer (New York: Grune & Stratton,1968), 217.
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how you choose, and how you express yourself.’10 Something similar is pointed
out by Eugene T. Gendlin, an advocate of the theory of experienced or felt
meanings: ‘Every individual lives in his subjective experiencing and looks out at
the world from it and through it.’11 Both authors argue in favour of the idea that
there is an additional meaning to our abstract concepts that goes beyond their
logical meanings. While logical meanings of abstract concepts represent
merely some general patterns of our experiences (say, that ‘hopelessness’ is an
emotion with a negative view of the future), they cannot grasp all the details
of our experience of hopelessness. That is to say, they cannot capture all 
the phenomenological and qualitative aspects associated with our abstract
concepts. Accordingly, if it is true that the content of our abstract concepts also
entails experience-related properties, then it would seem to follow we cannot
fully determine the meaning of abstract concepts until we include some of our
subjective experiences as well. These experiences provide an additional source
of information that is required for a more complete understanding of abstract
phenomena.
In what follows, I hope to demonstrate that Kant’s aesthetic ideas, as expressed
in works of art, can help us to overcome cognitive limitations that we often
experience in our attempts to articulate the meaning of abstract concepts. 
The gist of my argument is that aesthetic ideas make experience-related
properties of abstract concepts salient and thereby available for our
acknowledgement and further analysis. That is to say, aesthetic ideas make
abstract concepts more cognitively accessible to us, by creating image schemas
that allow us to think about these concepts in a way linked to sensory experience.
To develop my argument, I begin the first part of the paper with a discussion of
Kant’s doctrine of aesthetic ideas and explain how aesthetic ideas can serve as
a sensuous counterpart of abstract concepts. In the second part of the paper
I bring together the resources introduced and developed in the first part and
propose an account of the role of aesthetic ideas in promoting the meaning of
abstract concepts as it is determined by our own subjective experiences. 
II
In § 49 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant puts forward his view of artistic
beauty as being an expression of aesthetic ideas. According to him, an aesthetic
idea is a ‘representation of the imagination that occasions much thinking, though
10 Mark Johnson, The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2007), 61. 
11 Eugene T. Gendlin, Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning: A Philosophical and
Psychological Approach to the Subjective (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
1997), 228.
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without it being possible for any determinate thought, i.e., concept, to be
adequate to it, which, consequently, no language fully attains or can make intel -
ligible’.12 He adds, in § 57, that an aesthetic idea is ‘an intuition (of the imagination)
for which a concept can never be found adequate’ (CJ, p. 218; AA 5:342). 
It is suggested accordingly that aesthetic ideas are concrete sensible
representations of imagination, that is, images of some sort, and that these rich
images give rise to much thinking that cannot be fully described by any
determinate concepts.13 Aesthetic ideas are thus similar to ordinary images (for
example, of a flower), but they are dissimilar to ordinary images in that no
determinate concepts correspond to them (as an image of a flower corresponds
to the concept of a flower). Since aesthetic ideas lack determinate concepts, they
evade the possibility of cognition. That is to say, they cannot be cognized in an
ordinary sense by connecting intuitions with determinate concepts.
In Kant’s view, aesthetic ideas strive to exhibit concepts that go beyond 
the limits of our ordinary experience. He has two kinds of concepts in mind.
On the one hand, there are concepts of reason (rational ideas), such as ‘invisible
beings, the kingdom of the blessed, the kingdom of hell, eternity, creation, etc.’
They are ‘concept[s] to which no intuition (representation of imagination) can
be adequate’ (CJ, p. 192; AA 5:314). What is distinctive about them is that they
can be thought, but not empirically encountered. For example, we can think
of the idea of hell, but have no empirical intuition of it. For Kant, concepts that
lack an adequate sensible correlate are called indeterminate concepts (in
contrast to determinate concepts for which empirical intuition can be given)
(CJ, p. 215; AA 5:339).
On the other hand, Kant writes that aesthetic ideas can also exhibit concepts
‘of which there are examples in experience, e.g., death, envy, and all sorts of vices,
as well as love, fame, etc., […] with a completeness that goes beyond anything
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12 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 192 (AA 5:314). Hereafter: CJ. 
13 For a related reading of aesthetic ideas, see also Anthony Savile, Aesthetic Recon -
structions: The Seminal Writings of Lessing, Kant, and Schiller (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).
For example, he describes aesthetic ideas as ‘concrete presentations of particular
themes that are oﬀered us by individual works of art’ (p. 180). Wicks explains aesthetic
ideas similarly, as ‘meaning-rich images’; see Robert Wicks, ‘The Divine Inspiration for
Kant’s Formalist Theory of Beauty’, Kant Studies Online (2015): 26. Among others holding
a similar interpretation are Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Taste: A Reading of 
the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001),
283–84; Brigitte Sassen, ‘Artistic Genius and the Question of Creativity’, in Kant’s Critique
of the Power of Judgment: Critical Essays, ed. Paul Guyer (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2003), 173, and Donald W. Crawford, ‘Kant’s Theory of Creative Imagination’,
in Essays in Kant’s Aesthetics, ed. Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1982), 156.
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of which there is an example in nature’ (CJ, p. 192; AA 5:314).14 These kinds of
concept (typically classified as abstract) are dissimilar to rational ideas in that their
concrete instances can be experienced. For example, the concept of (romantic)
love is directly grounded in one’s emotional and bodily experience (through
behavioural signs like smiling, accelerated heartbeat, loss of appetite, and so
forth). On the other hand, they are also dissimilar to our ordinary (concrete)
empirical concepts (such as dog, table, chair) in that they refer to non-material
and non-concrete objects. For example, concepts such as love, envy and fame
have no particular shape, size or colour, and one cannot see, touch or hear them.
There is no single and concretely perceivable object that would correspond to
such concepts. Their referents are mental and emotional states, situations and
events. 
However, even though we can find examples of abstract concepts in ordinary
experiences, their full meaning extends beyond such experience. This is because,
as we have seen, the content of abstract concepts largely involves experiential
features, emotional aspects, and other introspective properties, such as beliefs,
memories, intentions, goals. For example, the content of the concept of alienation
contains detailed features of the felt experience (what alienation feels like
subjectively, how one acts when in this state of mind, and so forth). But the felt
experience or the quality of such a mental state cannot be directly exhibited in
ordinary experience.15 This is at least how I interpret Kant’s decision to include
abstract concepts in the category of concepts that aesthetic ideas strive to exhibit,
in spite of his claim that aesthetic ideas strive to exhibit concepts that go beyond
sensory experience. Thus, the implication seems to be that there is an additional,
indeterminate material to these concepts for which no sensible intuition can be
given and it is this material that aesthetic ideas strive to exhibit.
According to Kant, aesthetic ideas are generated by means of aesthetic
attributes. He describes aesthetic attributes primarily in terms of what they do –
namely, they ‘express only the implications connected with it [a concept] and its
aﬃnity with others’ (CJ, p. 193; AA 5:315). The function of aesthetic attributes is
14 Matherne uses the term ‘experience-oriented’ aesthetic ideas. She argues similarly that
aesthetic ideas can represent not only moral and rational ideas, but also everyday kinds
of ideas, concepts, and feelings. Samantha Matherne, ‘The Inclusive Interpretation of
Kant’s Aesthetic Ideas’, British Journal of Aesthetics 53 (2013): 21–39. Among others
holding a similar view are Rudolf Lüthe, ‘Kants Lehre von den ästhetischen Ideen’, Kant-
Studien 75 (1984): 65–74; Kenneth F. Rogerson, Kant’s Aesthetics: The Roles of Form and
Expression (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), 99; and Emine Hande Tuna,
‘A Kantian Hybrid Theory of Art Criticism: A Particularist Appeal to the Generalists’,
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 74 (2016): 397–411.
15 Rogerson has, I believe, something similar in mind when he writes: ‘while we may have
some experience of such things their full import is yet beyond ordinary experience, for
example our psychological attitudes to such things’ (Kant’s Aesthetics, 99).
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to bring to mind various connections or mental associations between diﬀerent
concepts and objects that, when taken together, give rise to a general idea (that
is, rational ideas or abstract concepts). Kant gives an example of the image of an
eagle with a lightning bolt in its talons, which functions as an aesthetic attribute
of the rational idea of the king of heaven in the sense that it expresses certain
associations and implications connected with this idea (in terms of representing
power, strength, freedom, being above the material world) (CJ, p. 193; AA 5:315). 
Kant says very little, however, about what exactly aesthetic attributes are and
how they come to occasion mental connections and associations. Fortunately, he
oﬀers a few remarks that can help us to formulate a plausible explanation. First,
he writes that aesthetic attributes are ‘supplementary representations of
imagination’ that ‘go alongside the logical ones’, which means that imagination
produces them in addition to logical attributes. Considering that logical attributes
‘constitute the presentation of a given concept itself’ (CJ, p.193; AA 5:315), that is,
a schema of a determinate concept, and thus they refer to general representations
that diﬀerent objects of the same kind have in common and in virtue of which
the determinate concept is applied, this means that aesthetic attributes must
refer to features of the object that go beyond these general features. Second,
aesthetic attributes are ‘attribute[s] of a representation of sense’ (CJ, p. 194; 
AA 5:316), meaning that they must refer to features of an object with which we
are directly perceptually acquainted. Third, they are product of ‘the imagination,
in its freedom from all guidance by rules’ (CJ, p. 195; AA 5:317), which means that
imagination produces them without being determined by the concept of 
the object. 
Taking all these points together, the suggestion seems to be that aesthetic
attributes refer to the distinctive aspects of a particular object, in contrast to those
aspects of the object which are shared by all members of a class and in virtue of
which the concept applies. Since these distinctive features of a particular object
are not determined by the concepts of an object, they are a product of
imagination in its free play. Let me explain this proposal in what follows. 
According to Kant’s epistemological theory, in order to have a perceptual
image, conceptual harmony between imagination and understanding is
necessary. We must perceive a certain combination of the sensible manifold under
some empirical concepts. However, even though recognition of objects proceeds
by the means of a schema, an abstract form shared by all members of a certain
kind, each particular image also diﬀers from others of its kind. That is, they diﬀer
in the additional features which are not determined (entailed) by the concept.
For instance, I recognize the ﬂower by the application of the ﬂower rule (schema)
to the sensible manifold. The ﬂower rule is a basic figurative mental representation
Cognitive Interpretation of Kant‘s Theory of Aesthetic Ideas
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of an object with petals, leaves, and stems in a specific relation. Yet a particular
image of a ﬂower may have a distinct shape of petals in a particular combination
of colours (that is, a distinctive combination of the general features). But these
distinctive features of this particular ﬂower are not entailed by the concept of
a ﬂower.16 This is because, as Kant writes, a concept ‘refers to the object indirectly,
by means of a characteristic that may be common to several things’.17 That is to
say, concepts can serve as rules only for the features of the object common 
to members of a certain kind, but cannot be rules for the individual features and
their combinations which are distinct and unique to the particular object itself.
As Sarah Gibbons in her analysis of Kant’s imagination puts it: ‘Concepts can only
provide a discursive unity of diverse representations possessing some common
feature; they do not represent those diverse representations as parts of a single
encompassing whole.’18 Thus, the presence of these additional features which are
not entailed by the concept shows that the activity of imagination is not fully
determined by the concept, and therefore can potentially be in free play. 
My suggestion is that aesthetic attributes refer to those specific and distinctive
features of an object that have been left undetermined by the concept of 
the object.19 Such an interpretation appears to be suggested by Kant in his
discussion of aesthetic ideas where he writes: 
in the use of the imagination for cognition, the imagination is under the constraint of
the understanding and is subject to the limitation of being adequate to its concept; 
in an aesthetic respect, however, the imagination is free to provide, beyond that concord
with the concept, unsought extensive undeveloped material for the understanding, of
which the latter took no regard in its concept, but which it applies, not so much
objectively, for cognition, as subjectively, for the animation of the cognitive powers. 
(CJ, p. 194; AA 5:317) 
16 The flower example pertains to the relation of concepts and particulars in general,
whereas my investigation is deliberately restricted to the reception of artworks.
17 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett,
1996), 366 (AA A320/B377).
18 Sarah L. Gibbons, Kant’s Theory of Imagination: Bridging Gaps in Judgement and
Experience (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 44. Among others making this point are
Keren Gorodeisky, ‘Schematizing without a Concept? Imagine That!’, Proceedings of
the European Society for Aesthetics 2 (2010): 182, and Mojca Kuplen, Beauty, Ugliness
and the Free Play of Imagination: An Approach to Kant’s Aesthetics (New York: Springer,
2015), 65–72.
19 My interpretation accordingly diﬀers from the view that aesthetic attributes supervene
on logical attributes, that is, general features of the object. For this view, see Andrew
Chignell, ‘Kant on the Normativity of Taste: The Role of Aesthetic Ideas’, Australian Journal
of Philosophy 85 (2007): 415–33, and Steven Ravett Brown, ‘On the Mechanism of the
Generation of Aesthetic Ideas in Kant’s Critique of Judgment’, British Journal for the History
of Philosophy 12 (2004): 487–99.
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As I read this passage, the ‘unsought extensive undeveloped material’ that sets
imagination and understanding into a free play refers to aesthetic attributes that
furnish an aesthetic idea. Kant explains this undeveloped material as something
that has been left out by the ordinary synthesis according to a determinate
concept. That is, the object has been recognized as the particular kind of thing it
is, say, an eagle, yet the sensible manifold in this object contains an additional
material that is not determined by the concept of the object. It is this additional
material of the object that aesthetic attributes take into account. To illustrate my
proposal, I will consider Picasso’s Weeping Woman (1937).
The painting depicts a grief-stricken face of a woman, weeping into
a handkerchief. One can immediately recognize that this is a painting of a human
face. One perceives the head, eyes, nose, and lips (that is, logical attributes), as
presented by the schema of a human face. But one also perceives a specific and
distinctive configuration of these features. The face is painted in diﬀerent
geometrical shapes, split into fragments; the shapes of the mouth, teeth, tears,
and the handkerchief used to dry the tears are almost fused into each other; 
the sides of the face are juxtaposed in such a way that they oﬀer simultaneously
a frontal and a profile perspective of the face. But these distinctive features are
not specified by the schema of a human face. Hence, they are products of
imagination in its free play. 
Yet one can also notice that it is precisely these distinctive features of a face,
combined together in this specific way, that bring to mind the thoughts, feelings,
moods, sensations, and other mental representations associated with the idea
we generally have of grief and loss. For instance, the feeling of disorientation and
anxiety as occasioned by the simultaneous presence of the frontal and profile
perspectives of the face, the idea of emotional brokenness conveyed by 
the fractured shapes of the face, brought together in an unnerving way or 
the idea of a paralyzing emptiness as beautifully expressed through the image
of woman’s chattering teeth, convulsively nibbling the handkerchief. It is 
the imaginative synthesis of these distinctive features of a woman’s face which
bring to mind diﬀerent associational thoughts connected with the idea we have
of grief or loss. Even though these ideas do not have a determinate empirical
counterpart, they can nevertheless be depicted through the synthesis of aesthetic
attributes (a collection of associations). In this way we are able to think about
these ideas in terms of a concrete perceptual experience.
Kant writes that in contrast to an empirical intuition, which is an external
representation of imagination, an aesthetic idea is an ‘inner intuition’ of
imagination (CJ, p. 192; AA 5:314). Although he does not explain what he means
by such inner intuitions, taking into account his remark that an aesthetic idea is
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a ‘coherent whole of an unutterable fullness of thought’ (CJ, p. 206; AA 5:329), it
is reasonable to assume that an aesthetic idea is a kind of a holistic mental
representation (or a pattern) of various semantic or intellectual elements
combined and unified.20 In other words, an aesthetic idea refers to a certain kind
of inner picturing of thoughts and associations that occur in our mind as we
reflect on a particular object or an artwork.21
It is important to point out that according to Kant the ability to express
aesthetic ideas is a special talent (or spirit) possessed by a genius. Thus, only
intentionally spirit-filled artworks can actually express aesthetic ideas. Even
though this idea appears to be inconsistent with Kant’s remark that all beauty,
thus also natural beauty, can express aesthetic ideas (CJ, p. 197; AA 5:320), this
inconsistency can be resolved by taking into account Kant’s claim in § 45 that
nature is beautiful if it looks like art (CJ, p. 185; AA 5:306). Accordingly, nature
might seem to be an expression of aesthetic ideas (since it looks like art), but in
fact it does not actually express aesthetic ideas (since it is not art). Only
intentionally created objects can express aesthetic ideas. But the fact that nature
cannot express aesthetic ideas does not mean that it cannot evoke certain kinds
of ideas. For instance, Kant writes that the white colour of the lily evokes the idea
of innocence and the bird’s song evokes the idea of joyfulness (CJ, p. 181; 
AA 5:302). These examples are not representative of a genuine expression of
aesthetic ideas, since they refer to sensations alone. Kant writes that even though
sensations can suggest certain kinds of ideas, he adds that these ideas are not
the result of free play, but rather an automatic by-product of associations
produced by the feeling that we connect with a certain colour or tone (CJ, p. 205;
AA 5:328). That is, ideas suggested by colours and tones are very vague, general
ideas that we naturally connect with certain sensations (such as sadness,
happiness, and so on) and do not leave much behind for reflection.
How exactly imagination produces aesthetic ideas is diﬃcult to say since Kant
does not provide any explanation of such an imaginative operation. Presumably,
the imagination is able to generate aesthetic ideas without being governed by
any determinate concepts, while, however, being in accordance with the general
need of the understanding to bring order and unity to the sensible manifold. Kant
describes the ability to produce aesthetic ideas as ‘the inborn predisposition of
the mind (ingenium)’ (CJ, p. 186; AA 5:307) and as a ‘particular spirit given to
20 Similarly, Chignell interprets an aesthetic idea as involving ‘a plurality of representations
or thoughts linked together’ (‘Kant on the Normativity of Taste’, 424).
21 For a similar reading, see Kenneth Berry, ‘Kandinsky, Kant, and a Modern Mandala’,
Journal of Aesthetic Education 42 (2008): 105–10. He refers to an aesthetic idea as
a ‘mental image’ or a ‘mind picture’. 
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a person at birth, which protects and guides him, and from whose inspiration
those original ideas stem’ (CJ, p. 187; AA 5:308). The artist himself cannot explain
how he comes to produce aesthetic ideas, nor can he describe these ideas to
others through the use of a determinate language. Kant writes that
the author of a product that he owes to his genius does not know himself how the ideas
for it come to him, and also does not have it in his power to think up such things at will
or according to plan, and to communicate to others precepts that would put them in
a position to produce similar products (CJ, p. 187; AA 5:308).
An aesthetic idea is conceptually indeterminate; it cannot be specified in the set
of criteria that others could follow (for otherwise the product could not be an
object of aesthetic appraisal). Kant claims: ‘the rule must be abstracted from 
the deed, i.e. from the product’ (CJ, p. 188; AA 5:309). That is to say, an aesthetic
idea can be grasped and communicated to others only through direct
observation and reflection on the particular work itself; merely hearing or
reading someone else’s description of the work cannot reveal the aesthetic idea. 
This is compatible with my interpretation of an aesthetic idea as generated by
the unique and distinct features of an object (aesthetic attributes), in contrast to
those general features that the object shares with others of its kind and can be
explicitly articulated (logical attributes). We can, for example, explicitly articulate
criteria for why we would classify something as a face, or as a flower, without
having to be directly acquainted with the object itself. Yet we cannot state such
criteria that uniquely identify particular objects in all their detail. For instance, it
is impossible to give a description that would apply completely accurately and
uniquely to Weeping Woman, and yet this particular work of art expresses an
aesthetic idea. Now, if an aesthetic idea is produced by the synthesis of particular
and distinct features of an object, but these particular features cannot be explicitly
articulated, that is, one cannot completely describe all the features of the
particular object (they can only be distinguished by observation), then it also
follows that an aesthetic idea itself cannot be grasped in a determinate concept.
As we have seen, concepts can only be based on commonalities between distinct
particular objects but cannot represent the individual features of the object. 
The only way an aesthetic idea can be revealed and communicated to others is
through a non-discursive, aﬀective mode of expression. The communication of
an aesthetic idea is subjective (as the term ‘aesthetic’ suggests) in the sense that
it can be communicated only through a direct feeling of the mental state of free
harmony between imagination and understanding. In other words, an aesthetic
idea can be grasped only through an aesthetic experience of the work, that is,
experiencing a sense of freedom and harmony in the playful interaction between
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diﬀerent associational thoughts that the imagination conjures up without being
governed by any determinate concepts, but which is nevertheless in agreement
with the understanding – namely, the sensible manifold is organized in a way that
exhibits indeterminate conceptual content. Thus, even though Kant writes that
an aesthetic idea is ineﬀable (cannot be expressed in a determinate language), it
is nonetheless communicable, that is, it can be revealed and communicated to
others through the aesthetic feeling of pleasure.22
III
I have so far argued that an aesthetic idea is a product of the synthesis of
imagination, whereby the components that comprise this synthesis are aesthetic
attributes, that is, thoughts, associations, and other mental representations
evoked by the distinctive features of an object or an artwork. If my account is
correct, then it is fair to say that aesthetic ideas can capture the introspective,
emotional, and aﬀective properties associated with our abstract concepts. 
As we have seen, our ordinary conceptual vocabulary is inadequate to fully
determine all the implicit meanings of concepts such as love, hopelessness or
freedom. The only way to express what is ineﬀable in our abstract concepts is by
means of their associations with aesthetic attributes, that is, supplementary
representations of imagination that express implications and kinships between
diﬀerent concepts and objects (say, kinship between the image of the fractured
shape of a face and the idea of emotional brokenness). In other words, aesthetic
ideas are concrete representations holding together various introspective,
emotional, and aﬀective aspects involved in our experience of abstract concepts.
The availability of such imaginary representations can profoundly expand 
the meaning of these concepts and further our understanding of them.
I believe this is the idea Kant has in mind when he writes that an aesthetic idea
‘aesthetically enlarges the concept itself in an unbounded way’ (CJ, p. 193; 
AA 5:315), thereby implying that expansion of a concept is not logical expansion
that proceeds by adding actual properties or logical attributes to the concept.23
Rather, the expansion of a concept proceeds aesthetically, that is, by means of
aesthetic attributes that bring to mind a multitude of thoughts, feelings, moods,
22 This is also pointed out by Charles DeBort, ‘Geist and Communication in Kant’s Theory
of Aesthetic Ideas’, Kantian Review 17 (2012): 177–90.
23 For the view that the kind of knowledge that aesthetic ideas give rise to cannot be
captured in terms of logical or determinate knowledge, see also Michel Chaouli, 
‘A Surfeit in Thinking: Kant’s Aesthetic Ideas’, Yearbook of Comparative Literature 
57 (2011): 55–77; Rudolf A. Makkreel, Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: 
The Hermeneutical Import of the Critique of Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1990), 120–22; and Matherne, ‘Inclusive Interpretation’, 36–37. 
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and sensations connected with the given concept. One may, for example, notice
that Weeping Woman does not broaden our definition of grief as an emotional
state experienced due to significant loss, but rather it stimulates our reflection on
a whole range of reactions, emotions, thoughts, beliefs, other mental aspects, and
eﬀects involved in our experience of grief and loss. Thus, the kind of knowledge
that aesthetic ideas add to our concepts refers to knowledge of the various
introspective, emotional, and aﬀective aspects connected with our abstract
concepts, but cannot be explicitly articulated in words and propositions.
This is at least how I interpret Kant’s claims that an aesthetic idea ‘occasions
much thinking though without it being possible for any determinate thought,
i.e., concept, to be adequate to it’ (CJ, p. 192; AA 5:314); or ‘gives more to think
about than can be grasped and made distinct in it (although it does, to be sure,
belong to the concept of the object)’ (CJ, p. 193; AA 5:315); and ‘no expression
designating a determinate concept can be found for it, which therefore allows
the addition to a concept of much that is unnameable’ (CJ, p. 194; AA 5:316). 
In these passages Kant uses words such as ‘much thinking’ or ‘more to think’
which seem to suggest that non-discursivity is caused by the great quantity of
thoughts, which in principle could be articulated in a determinate language, 
but their excess makes it diﬃcult to do so. This, I believe, is not what Kant has in
mind. Thoughts provided by aesthetic ideas are not merely diﬃcult; rather, they
are impossible to conceptualize since they themselves are, as Kant puts it,
‘unnameable’. The kind of thoughts that aesthetic ideas add to our concepts are
such that they cannot be explicitly articulated in words and propositions, but, as
Kant states, ‘belong to the concept’. Yet the kind of thoughts that appear to meet
these two characteristics – namely, non-discursivity and pertaining to the concept
– are the kind of thoughts that refer to the introspective, aﬀective, and emotional
aspects associated with our concepts.
Consider again the concept of grief. Even though we can explicitly articulate
the meaning of grief as being an emotion, experienced due to the loss of
someone or something important to us, this conceptual meaning cannot give
a full account of the idea of grief as we experience it from the inside. As I have
pointed out, our ordinary language is not rich enough or precise enough to
grasp and explicate all the subtle aspects of our experience. What we ordinarily
explicate by saying that we feel grief is merely some rough aspect of our
experience, while a great deal of meaning is left unelaborated. It is this
unelaborated meaning of our abstract concepts that aesthetic ideas carry
forward. Aesthetic ideas make experience-related features of abstract concepts
salient by connecting them with particular imaginable representations, thereby
making them more cognitively accessible to us. They thus provide us with an
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additional source of information that is required for a more complete
understanding of abstract phenomena. 
Such a view is implied in Kant’s claim that concepts without intuitions are
empty.24 He refers to empirical concepts which need to be connected to empirical
intuitions in order to make sense of experience. Without empirical intuitions,
empirical concepts are mere words, lacking any substantive meaning. But the
same can be said of abstract thoughts and ideas, such as the concepts of truth,
love, grief, hopelessness, and vulnerability. Only by connecting these kinds of
concepts with sensible intuitions (by means of aesthetic attributes) can we truly
say that we understand what they mean. Aesthetic ideas thus fill in the emptiness
that abstract concepts on their own would leave without empirical intuitions. 
The idea that aesthetic ideas can enrich and broaden the experiential
dimension of our concepts has also recently been pointed out by Samantha
Matherne in her claim that aesthetic ideas expand our subjective connections to
concepts in that they reveal ‘the richness of experience we too often overlook
in the exigencies of everyday life’25 and thereby provide us with ways of
‘entertaining new possibilities or looking at the concept in diﬀerent ways’.26
She gives an example of Proust’s description of a madeleine cake and writes: 
‘The aesthetic idea and aesthetic attributes involved in that passage augment my
concept of a madeleine with subjective characteristics, like memory, childhood,
and nostalgia.’27 Although I am certainly in agreement with Matherne’s view on
the aesthetic idea as enlivening our abstract notions, I also find her account
unsatisfying, for it does not explain how exactly aesthetic ideas come to expand
our subjective connections to concepts. 
My proposal is that the aesthetic idea expands our subjective connections to
concepts and broadens our interpretation of experiences by expressing diﬀerent
meanings that abstract concepts can have for us. If aesthetic ideas are products
of the imaginative synthesis of various thoughts and associations (that is,
aesthetic attributes), this implies that they are able to capture and bring together
various introspective, emotional, and aﬀective aspects connected with our
concepts and can thereby express the experience-related meaning of concepts.
Aesthetic ideas furnish the meaning of an experience by selecting, specifying,
and bringing together diﬀerent introspective, emotional, and aﬀective aspects.
Since there can be many diﬀerent ways of selecting and combining aspects, there
can be many diﬀerent meanings of an experience prompted by an aesthetic idea.
24 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 107 (AA A51/B75).
25 Matherne, ‘Inclusive Interpretation’, 30.
26 Ibid., 37
27 Ibid.
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Each expression of an aesthetic idea brings a diﬀerent meaning of an experience
and thereby a diﬀerent perspective on abstract concepts. Herein lies the ori -
ginality of aesthetic ideas. To see exactly how aesthetic ideas can express different
meanings of our abstract concepts, let us consider Michael Haneke’s film 
The Seventh Continent (1989).
The movie is an agonizing story of a well-situated Austrian family and their
attempt to escape the feeling of emotional and social isolation in the modern
world by choosing to commit a suicide. The mental state of emptiness and
depersonalization that accompanies the everyday life of this family is represented
through images of objects, rather than subjects. We do not see characters’ faces,
but merely fragmented and isolated shots of their hands turning oﬀ the alarm
clock, opening curtains, putting toothpaste on a toothbrush, tying shoelaces,
making coﬀee. Using a cinematic technique that emphasizes the state of
imprisonment by our daily routines, Haneke manages here to give a perceptible
form to the feeling of the emptiness of one’s existence, and thereby provides us
with a rare opportunity to recognize certain mental states, emotions, and ideas
that cannot be directly represented. Through the depiction of emotionless and
depersonalized performances of our daily routines, the film represents the idea
of emotional emptiness, that is, how these emotional states themselves look.
We often experience such mental states, yet have difficulty in understanding
it clearly. Through the objectification of the idea of emotional isolation, we have
an extraordinary opportunity to perceive this emotion in a more formulated and
comprehensive way. 
In particular, the film offers one of many possible ways to understand 
the experience of emotional emptiness and alienation. The meaning of an
experience is brought out by carefully selecting and specifying certain aspects of
experience. For example, the feeling of being trapped in a life of routine as
expressed by the depiction of mechanically performed daily tasks, the idea of
depersonalization and loss of communication as conveyed by the narration
accentuating the monotony of the characters’ day-to-day lives and their
impersonal verbal exchanges, and how these feelings ultimately lead to 
the experience of despair and anger at the world, as vividly expressed by 
the images of the characters demolishing their house and all their possessions
and finally their decision to escape the feeling of imprisonment by choosing to
commit suicide. 
Haneke’s film oﬀers one particular form that the idea of emotional emptiness
and alienation can take, but there are many other possible ways of expressing
this idea. To give an example, Edvard Munch’s painting Evening on Karl Johan Street
(1892) conveys the idea of emotional isolation and alienation by depicting
Cognitive Interpretation of Kant‘s Theory of Aesthetic Ideas
62 Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics, LVI/XII, 2019, No. 1, 00–00
Zlom1_2019_Sestava 1  5.4.19  8:01  Stránka 62
a crowd of people, detached and isolated from one another, with indistinct faces.
Thus, by emphasizing the experience of anonymity, isolation, and loss of self-
awareness, the painting adds to yet another meaning that the idea of alienation
can have for us. Both, Haneke and Munch have instantiated the same concept of
alienation and emotional isolation, yet they express a diﬀerent meaning of an
experience of alienation. That is to say, they express two diﬀerent aesthetic ideas
and communicate in two diﬀerent ways the meaning of our abstract concepts
since it is determined by our own subjective experiences. 
Aesthetic ideas, as expressed in works of art, are equipped with a rich and
sophisticated vocabulary,  a collection of associative images (aesthetic attributes)
that can, furthermore, carry finely determined, more specific aspects of our
experience, which are more diﬃcult to grasp and articulate by ordinary language.
They can make us explicitly aware of what we formerly had only an implicit sense.
Aesthetic ideas aﬀord us with an opportunity to imagine the introspective,
emotional, and aﬀective aspects connected with our concepts, thereby imbuing
them with a more substantive meaning and understanding. 
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